Voluntary agreements to protect private forests – A realist review

نویسندگان

چکیده

There is increasing political interest in the use of voluntary agreements (VA) as a policy instrument. The attraction has grown also environmental policy, VAs are expected to be less costly, more effective and cost-efficient than regulation. Using realist review methodology, our analysis focuses on effect contextual factors mechanisms private forest owners' willingness enter into formal nature conservation agreements. framework we analyse effects includes: owner characteristics, attributes, institutional context process, advisors other owners, contract design, for – economic attitudes, sense autonomy, justice fairness, trust well knowledge, mechanisms. allowed merging findings from different types varying contexts systematized way, consolidating evidence how influence programme implementation its outcome. 43 reviewed articles, an originally retrieved set 2231 papers, provide attitudes supporting agreement. Environmental strengthened by wishes protect heritage, suggesting considerable through personal, emotional attachment forest. This finding shows central role played with compensation importantly affecting VA. Along these results, developed comprehensive analytical can become if tailored owners.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Voluntary Agreements and Private Enforcement of Environmental Regulation

This paper focuses on a type of voluntary pollution abatement agreement (VA) in which the regulator offers regulatory relief for the participating firm in exchange for environmental improvements. If the regulator does not have statutory authority to provide regulatory relief, the VA can leave the firm more vulnerable to legal challenges through citizen lawsuits. I use a model of negotiated VAs ...

متن کامل

A Framework for Analyzing Environmental Voluntary Agreements

Voluntary Agreements (VAs) are collaborative arrangements between firms and regulators in which firms voluntarily commit to actions that improve the natural environment. The regulator encourages and/or supervises these actions. This cooperation with regulatory agencies can be used by nrms as a strategic tool to reduce tneir regulatory burden, develop new environmental competencies ahead of comp...

متن کامل

What’s Needed to Develop Strategic Purchasing in Healthcare? Policy Lessons from a Realist Review

Background In the context of serious concerns over the affordability of healthcare, various authors and international policy bodies advise that strategic purchasing is a key means of improving health system performance. Such advice is typically informed by theories from the economics of organization (EOO). This paper proposes that these theories are insufficient for a full understanding o...

متن کامل

Voluntary Agreements to Improve Environmental Quality: Symbolic and Substantive Cooperation

Within the context of environmental voluntary agreements (VAs), this paper analyzes the determinants of the degree of participation by firms in collective corporate political strategies that aim to shape government policy. We demonstrate that substantive cooperative strategies are more likely to be pursued by firms that enter a VA close to its initiation, while symbolic cooperation is more like...

متن کامل

Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions

If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court, voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry can be welfareimproving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreements differ from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimum may be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is not attainable using tax instruments. The no...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Forest Policy and Economics

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1872-7050', '1389-9341']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2021.102457