Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-Wide Targets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The division problem with voluntary participation
The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will nd acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the divi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Land Economics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0023-7639,1543-8325
DOI: 10.3368/le.84.1.97