Voters, bureaucrats and legislators

On - line Appendix for “ Bureaucrats , Voters , and Public Investment ”

Can Voters be Primed to Choose Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India

Ethnic politics and political corruption are important concerns in many developing country democracies. We conducted field experiments in rural India to examine the responsiveness of voter preferences to priming about the relevance of ethnicity and politician quality for service delivery. We used vignette experiments to examine how voter preferences vary with information about politician qualit...

Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?∗

Traditionally, bureaucrats are viewed as a stereotypical example of employees with flat pay schedules and low-powered incentive schemes. This paper challenges this view by providing evidence that wages of a particular group of senior bureaucrats city managers are tightly connected to their performance. In particular, salaries of city managers are strongly linked to city growth. Additional tests...

Bureaucrats and Public Procurement

This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual realizations of benefit and costs of the project, the second game to be played afterward. In the first game the relationship-specific investments of agency and sel...

Patients, doctors, and legislators.

A I prepared to examine a new patient, “B,” I commented on her lovely necklace. B told me that her mother had given it to her more than 20 years ago, when she was diagnosed with a serious medical condition. “Oh?” I asked. My curiosity was piqued—B hadn’t reported any important family history. Her mother, it turned out, had Huntington’s disease. The necklace was a gift, given before her mother d...