Voting Behavior in Proportional Elections from Agent – Based Models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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Influence among individuals is at the core of collective social phenomena such as the dissemination of ideas, beliefs or behaviors, social learning and the diffusion of innovations. Different mechanisms have been proposed to implement inter-agent influence in social models from the voter model, to majority rules, to the Granoveter model. Here we advance in this direction by confronting the rece...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physics Procedia
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1875-3892
DOI: 10.1016/j.phpro.2015.02.009