Voting under Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voting under Constraints
We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, th...
متن کاملVoting by committees under constraints
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters’ preferences are separable or additively representable. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D7.
متن کاملMorphological Disambiguation by Voting Constraints
We present a constraint-based morphological disambiguation system in which individual constraints vote on matching morphological parses, and disambiguation of all the tokens in a sentence is performed at the end by selecting parses that receive the highest votes. This constraint application paradigm makes the outcome of the disambiguation independent of the rule sequence, and hence relieves the...
متن کاملMorphological Disambiguation by Voting Constraints
We present a constraint-based morphological disambiguation system in which individual constraints vote on matching morphological parses, and disambiguation of all the tokens in a sentence is performed at the end by selecting parses that receive the highest votes. This constraint application paradigm makes the outcome of the disambiguation independent of the rule sequence, and hence relieves the...
متن کاملMultidimensional Voting under Uncertainty ∗
The nonexistence of equilibria in platform setting games with mutliple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper we relax the stardard assumption that parties either have perfect information about the electorate or that they behave as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties are instead uncertainty averse. What is more,...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2301