Voting with your pocketbook — a stochastic model of consumer boycotts
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voting with your pocketbook - a stochastic model of consumer boycotts
This paper presents a model of consumer boycotts where the discrete choices of concerned consumers are represented as a stochastic processes. Boycotts are interpreted as a form of voting where consumers are trying to shape the behavior of firms.We solve for the limiting distribution of the process and analyze its properties. We then discuss how the model relates to standard game-theoretic appro...
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This paper presents a model of consumer boycotts where the discrete choices of concerned consumers are represented as a stochastic processes. We solve for the limiting distribution of the process and analyze its properties. We then discuss how the model relates to game-theoretic models of collective action and derive an equilibrium selection result. The type of equilibrium selected depends on t...
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I present a model for consumer boycotts. The more a firm complies with consumers’ wishes, the higher its marginal cost, but the lower the probability of facing a consumer boycott. I show that the threat of a consumer boycott can increase the expected profits of firms. Firms lose out when they do face a boycott, but gain even more when their competitor does, giving them more market power. The st...
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This paper empirically investigates to what extent individuals vote with their pocketbooks in income redistribution. Survey data on preferences for redistribution show significant deviations from pocketbook voting in the poorest and the richest income groups. Differences in income status, education status, and other factors related to perceived social mobility cannot fully explain cross-country...
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This paper addresses the question of whether incumbents can buy political support through targeted public spending. Using a regression discontinuity approach which takes advantage of the quasi-experimental design of a recent Romanian government program that distributed coupons worth 200 Euros to poor families towards the purchase of a computer, we find that program beneficiaries were significan...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical and Computer Modelling
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0895-7177
DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.043