WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION THROUGH NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Wage and Employment Determination through Non-Cooperative Bargaining1
This paper investigates wage and employment determination by a group of workers or union and a rm, making use of the techniques of non-cooperative bargaining. Previous analyses have examined wage determination with an arti cial restriction that employment is determined either before or after wage determination has occurred. Here, employment determination is made part of the bargaining process....
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thank Björn Brügemann, Bob Hall, Giuseppe Moscarini, Rob Shimer, and the participants in seminars at Northwestern, Yale and Duke for useful comments. I also thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism. I am particularly grateful to Rob Shimer for pointing out a serious mistake in early versions of the paper. The National Science Foundation provided research supp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scottish Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0036-9292,1467-9485
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00437.x