Wage Rigidity, Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and Economic Efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
‘ Wage Rigidity and Unemployment in OECD Countries ’
Econometric investigations of individual countries’ experiences with inflation and unemployment in the 1970’s have shown that it is no longer sufficient to simply assume that wages are sticky in order to explain observed macroeconomic phenomena and make policy recommendations. A number of theoretical papers appearing in the last few years, motivated in part by the international econometric comp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0013-0133
DOI: 10.2307/2232887