Wealth Transfer Effects of Analysts' Misleading Behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Accounting Research
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0021-8456,1475-679X
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00228.x