Welfare maximization entices participation

Welfare Maximization Entices Participation

We consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. As a corollary, we obtain a c...

متن کامل

Draft – May 20 , 2016 Welfare Maximization Entices Participation

We consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two corollaries of our result...

متن کامل

Submodular Welfare Maximization

We study different variants of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. Assume there are n buyers interested in m items. Indeed they have different valuations on each item, i.e. buyer i has a valuation of wi(j) on item j. In the simplest model, a collection of items S worths ∑ j∈S wi(j) for buyer i; However, in practice, collection of items might have different values than th...

متن کامل

Submodular welfare maximization

We study different variants of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. Assume there are n buyers interested in m items. Indeed they have different valuations on each item, i.e. buyer i has a valuation of wi(j) on item j. In the simplest model, a collection of items S worths ∑ j∈S wi(j) for buyer i; However, in practice, collection of items might have different values than th...

متن کامل

Fair welfare maximization

We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations. The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an a priori evaluation of ...

متن کامل

Welfare maximization entices participation

نویسندگان

چکیده

منابع مشابه