منابع مشابه
What ’ s Wrong with Strong Necessities ?
1.1 Conceivability and PossibilityDavid Chalmers’ challenge to physicalism has dominated the philosophy of mind for the last seventeen years. His 1995paper ‘Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness’ and his 1996 book The Conscious Mind reinvigorated the debate between physicalists and dualists. But Chalmers’ mature attack on physicalism appeared over a decade later in his extensive 2009 paper ...
متن کاملPhysicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities
David Chalmers’ conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don’t fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But ...
متن کاملArgumentation Frameworks with Necessities
In this paper, we introduce argumentation frameworks with necessities (AFNs), an extension of Dung’s argumentation frameworks (AFs) taking into account a necessity relation as a kind of support relation between arguments (an argument is necessary for another). We redefine the acceptability semantics for these extended frameworks and we show how the necessity relation allows a direct and easy co...
متن کاملConceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities
I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of conceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of) our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our know...
متن کاملFrom Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities∗
Humeans and non-Humeans commonly and reasonably agree that there may be necessary connections (“necessities”, for short) between entities that are identical—e.g., Hesperus and Phosphorus, water and H2O—or merely partly distinct—e.g., sets and their individual members, fusions and their individual parts, instances of determinates and determinables, members of certain natural kinds and certain of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Studies
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0031-8116,1573-0883
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0195-6