When costly voting is beneficial
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Optimal Voting System When Voting is Costly∗
We consider the design of an optimal voting system when voting is costly. For a private values model with two alternatives we show the optimality of a voting system that combines three elements: (i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and non-participation is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is sequential; (iii) not all voters are invited to participate in ...
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We study optimal dynamic voting procedures when voting is costly. For a highly stylized speci cation of our model with private values, two alternatives, and binary, equally likely types we show the optimality of a voting procedure that combines two main elements: (i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and abstention is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is s...
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We propose a formulation for the problem of designing an optimal dynamic voting system when voting is costly. The possibility to coordinate participation by voting sequentially requires explicit maximization over a set of dynamic mechanisms which involves some arguments that are new to the theory of mechanism design. For a highly stylized specification of our model with private values and two a...
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We propose a formulation for the problem of designing an optimal dynamic voting procedure when voting is costly. The possibility to coordinate participation by voting sequentially requires explicit maximization over a set of dynamic mechanisms which involves some arguments that are new to the theory of mechanism design. For a highly stylized specification of our model with private values, two a...
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We study costly voting as a dynamic mechanism design problem and identify three characteristics of any optimal mechanism in a highly stylized setting: (1) sequential participation decisions, (2) interpreting non-participation as a vote for some default, and (3) delegating the vote to a committee that excludes some voters.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.013