When Price Discrimination Fails - A Principal Agent Problem with Social Influence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
When Price Discrimination Fails – A Principal Agent Problem with Social Influence
I develop a theoretical model of price discrimination under social influence. I find that social influence gives sellers the incentive to artificially create and maintain excess demand on the market. The rationing occurs mainly at the low end of the market, and sometimes results in full rationing of the low end. Furthermore, the incidence of price discrimination under social influence is much l...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2568666