When redistribution makes personalized pricing of externalities useless
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12505