When Will First-Price Work Well? The Impact of Anti-Corruption Rules on Photovoltaic Power Generation Procurement Auctions

Along with the prevalence of photovoltaic (PV) procurement contracts, corruption between auctioneers and potential electricity suppliers has attracted attention energy regulators. This study considers a corruption-proof environment wherein is strictly suppressed. It elaborates mechanism to explore impact measures on PV auctions. adopts incentive compatible constraints based revelation principle reflect firms’ optimal utilities. employs first-price first-score auctions uses Bayesian Nash equilibrium provide description market outcomes. The results show that several strategies have different impacts social welfare, utility, benefits corruption. First, auction cannot act as suitable policy because it may encourage Second, choice desirable for welfare fit forthcoming high-quality low-price surroundings. Third, strategy maximizes utility total income. implications suggest regulators ought not employ in future from perspective welfare. Another disadvantage approach enables firm maintain utmost benefit