Who Goes First? Strategic Delay Under Information Asymmetry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2814126