منابع مشابه
Why I am a Platonist
This is essentially Davies’ fi rst fl avor of Platonism, but in his article he isn’t content with my phrase “there is” a body of objects etc., but feels he must characterize this belief as existence in a realm outside or beyond spacetime. I think using these prepositions already implies certain philosophical, specifi cally ontological, assumptions. Hersh is more tolerant, merely adding the qual...
متن کاملWhy I am not a nominalist
Nominalists think there are no mathematical objects, henceforth, "numbers." Here is how the debate about nominalism has sometimes been presented. First there's the argument AGAINST, credited to Quine: numbers are indispensable to natural science, hence they exist. Then there's the argument FOR nominalism: they are not (indispensable) either, which leaves us no reason to think that they exist. I...
متن کاملWhy I am not an Everettian
1. Introduction. In this paper I try to present, as clearly as possible, why I do not believe
متن کاملWhy I Am Not a Property Dualist
I have argued in a number of writings that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is “bottom up,” whereby the...
متن کاملWhy I Am Not a Co-Citationist*
Some of us make modest use of citation analysis in our work, 1 but remain radically skeptical of the claims of those who devote more prime time and energy to the elaboration of such methods. Why do we not accept the faith? Why can we not do the proper Kuhnian thing and let the “paradigmatic achievements” of the new quantitative methods define the field for us—posing our fundamental problems, la...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: College & Research Libraries News
سال: 2000
ISSN: 2150-6698,0099-0086
DOI: 10.5860/crln.61.4.299