Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Revista Brasileira de Economia
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0034-7140
DOI: 10.1590/s0034-71402001000100002