Why Do Companies Use Performance-Related Pay for Their Executive Directors?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Do directors perform for pay ? $
Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996–2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on ...
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Performance pay, at least as usually understand, is no good idea for non-executive directors. They have to supervise and control or in some situations even to fire and replace the executive managers. This means that their performance as supervisors is totally different from the performance of the supervised executive managers and even the company at large. Moreover, they are mostly interested i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Governance
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0964-8410,1467-8683
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00391.x