Why do some senior managers inflate firms’ reported earnings? Economic causes and potential solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Why Do Managers Voluntarily Release Earnings Forecasts?
Managers often release earnings forecasts in advance of actual earnings announcements. It would appear that managers should at best be indifferent to such release given that the actual earnings will be disclosed at a future date. However, if the manager’s objective is to maximize his firm’s market value and he has control of production decisions, he may be motivated to release an earnings forec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv5i1c3p1