Willingness to Pay and the Sovereign Debt Contract
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Default Costs, Willingness to Pay and Sovereign Debt Buybacks
The arguments put forward by Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991) against sovereign debt buybacks are re-examined in a willingness-to-pay framework. This paper argues that the Bulow-Rogoff framework treats default by a debtor as an event with no dead-weight loss, and, as such, underestimates the potential gains from a buyback. The willingness-to-pay framework allows dead-weight costs of default to be ...
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A study was undertaken in southern peninsular state of India, the Tamil Nadu State, to assess the farmers’ “Willingness to pay” (WTP) for receiving annual health care services to their dairy animals. The districts of the state were categorized as “Livestock developed” (LD) and “Livestock under developed” (LUD) based on initial base line developed. Contingent valuation (CV) approach was used to ...
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In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk sharing, and capital flows in an environment of limited enforcement. We also discuss recent progress on default...
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Why do countries repay their debts? If countries in default have sufficient opportunities to save, Bulow and Rogoff [6] have shown that the answer cannot stem from a country’s desire to preserve a reputation for repayment. As a result, researchers have explained the existence of sovereign debt by either placing restrictions on the deposit contracts banks can offer, or by looking outside the cre...
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What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What implications does this have for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement – to promote a swap with a supermajority of creditors. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1514-0326,1667-6726
DOI: 10.1080/15140326.2007.12040481