Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and scepticism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Wittgenstein on Knowledge (1949-1951)
In this paper, I want to characterize Wittgenstein’s epistemology, namely his contextualism, presented in his notes published under the title On Certainty. This characterization will be made in terms of a comparison with four control points in order to put into light the peculiarities of Wittgenstein’s epistemological position. The markers I will use for that purpose will give an indication of ...
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One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoria, Beograd
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0351-2274,2406-081X
DOI: 10.2298/theo1603093d