Work experience, information revelation, and study effort

Trade and revelation of information

We consider an economy with asymmetric information and two types of agents, fully informed and uninformed. Uninformed agents update their information observing equilibrium prices and the equilibrium levels of other agents’ excess demand. We show that, for a generic set of economies, there are rational expectations equilibria which are partially revealing on an open, dense set of signals of posi...

Information revelation in auctions

Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider the question of whether or not bidders will be able to keep their information private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal all their information, even if this information revelation is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller m...

Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness

This paper introduces a theory of market incompleteness based on the information transmission role of prices and its adverse impact on the provision of insurance in financial markets. We analyse a simple security design model in which the number and payoff of securities are endogenous. Agents have rational expectations and differ in information, endowments, and attitudes toward risk. When marke...

Incentives and control for information revelation - an empirical study

The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-schedule Flexibility

The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and WorkSchedule Flexibility Author(s): Deborah J. Anderson, Melissa Binder, Kate Krause Source: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, (Jan., 2003), pp. 273-294 Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3590938 Accessed: 14/08...