Worker-firm relational contracts in the time of shutdowns: experimental evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by reputational concerns—are prevalent both within and between firms. This paper develops repeated-game models of relational contracts that show how and why relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (non-integration). We show that integration affects the parties’ temptations to renege on relational contr...
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I analyze the effect of long-term relations on the property rights theory of the firm when agents’s actions affect the structure of the game. In this setting, renegotiation proof relational contracts exists. Single ownership dominates joint ownership when the discount factor is very high or very low, however there exists a mid-region where joint ownership becomes optimal. Joint ownership has a ...
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In this paper, a formal rent-seeking theory of the rm is developed. The main idea is that integration (compared to non-integration) facilitates rentseeking for the integrating party, but makes it harder for the integrated one. In a one-period model, this implies that the rent-seeking contest becomes more uneven and the parties rent-seek less. Here, integration is optimal. In the in nitely-repe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09697-1