Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor Supply
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Technology and Labor Regulations
Many low skilled jobs have been substituted away for machines in Europe, or eliminated, much more so than in the US, while technological progress at the “top”, i.e. at the high-tech sector, is faster in the US than in Europe. This paper suggests that the main difference between Europe and the US in this respect is their different labor market policies. European countries reduce wage flexibility...
متن کاملRisk Sharing Or Bargaining?: The Impact of Spousal Labor Supply on Unemployment Duration
This paper theoretically studies and empirically estimates (1) how spousal labor supply affects bargaining between the husband and wife over their private consumption, and (2) the impact of this intrahousehold bargaining on their reservation wage and unemployment duration. We consider a model of household job search in which the outcomes of bargaining are determined by the sharing rule of Chiap...
متن کاملSickness insurance and spousal labour supply
☆ Part of this work was completed while visiting the D University. Financial support from the Jan Wallander Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. ☆☆ The authors are grateful for comments by Peter Fred Ichino, Ethan Kaplan, Rafael Lalive, Erik Lindqvist, Må Pettersson-Lidbom, Emilia Simeonova, Helena Svaleryd a pants at the 2009 SUDSWEc conference inUppsala.We als ceptional research assistance....
متن کاملTrade and Labor Reallocation with Heterogeneous Enforcement of Labor Regulations
Trade and Labor Reallocation with Heterogeneous Enforcement of Labor Regulations This paper revisits the question of how trade openness affects labor market outcomes in a developing country setting. We explore the fact that plants face varying degrees of exposure to global markets and to the enforcement of labor market regulations, and rely on Brazil’s currency crisis in 1999 as an exogenous so...
متن کاملModes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment1
We formulate a model of household behavior in which cooperation is costly and in which these costs vary across households. Some households rationally decide to behave noncooperatively, which in our context is an efficient outcome. An intriguing feature of the model is that, while the welfare of the spouses is continuous in the state variables, labor supply decisions are not. Small changes in st...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.252