XI.—The Nature of Judgment

On the Nature of Moral Judgment

I critically examine the existing data in emotion research to show that empathy is not necessary for moral judgment. I argue that other emotions, such as disgust, are responsible for moral judgment, and that humans are able to make moral judgments without empathy. Autistic individuals are of interest because they are said to lack empathy, yet display some form of morality. Thus, empathy cannot ...

identifying the nature and type of court judgment

the decisions of the court of justice at any levels of proceeding up to its termination, to some extend indicate the viewpoints of the court and its approach towards the claims and the defenses of the parties to lawsuit. when the trial ends, the court declares its decisive resolution within the framework of a judgment, and in proportion to the type of claim object and the course of trial procee...

Mechanical explanation of nature and its limits in Kant's Critique of judgment.

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical law...

Kant on the Rationality of Moral Judgment

Judgment

The concept of a judgment as a logical action which introduces new information into a deductive system is examined. This leads to a way of mathematically representing implication which is distinct from the familiar material implication, according to which “If A then B” is considered to be equivalent to “B or not-A”. This leads, in turn, to a resolution of the paradox of the raven.