The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
نویسندگان
چکیده
The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters’ preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios. Classification JEL : D71, D72.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 49 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017