Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young's theorem
نویسنده
چکیده
We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: singlevalued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the second property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games. Keywords: Monotonicity, Core, TU games, nucleolus per capita Dpto. Ftos. A. Económico I, Basque Country University, L. Agirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain. Email: [email protected]. J. Arin acknowledges nancial support from Project 9/UPV00031.321-15352/2003 of the University of the Basque Country, Projects BEC2003-08182 and SEJ-2006-05455 of the Ministry of Education and Science of Spain and Project GIC07/146-IT-377-07 of the Basque Goverment. Likewise,
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 42 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013