Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
نویسنده
چکیده
Article history: Received 20 June 2011 Available online 28 November 2013 JEL classification: C78 D43 L13
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 83 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014