Pandering and Pork-Barrel Politics∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We develop a model of pork-barrel politics in which a government offi cial tries to improve her re-election chances by spending on targeted interest groups. The spending signals that she shares their concerns. We investigate the effect of such pandering on the public deficit. Pandering makes the deficit worse if either the offi cial’s overall spending propensity is known, or if it is unknown but the effect of spending on the deficit is suffi ciently opaque to voters. By contrast, an unknown spending propensity may induce the offi cial to exhibit fiscal discipline if there is enough deficit transparency.
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تاریخ انتشار 2014