Perfect competition in an oligopoly ( including bilateral

نویسندگان

  • Pradeep Dubey
  • Dieter sondermann
  • Martin Shubik
  • Dieter Sondermann
چکیده

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

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Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

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تاریخ انتشار 2008