On the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for (0, 1) bimatrix games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in a nonzero sum bimatrix game is an important open question. We put forward the notion of (0, 1)-bimatrix games, and show that some associated computational problems are as hard as in the general case.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Inf. Process. Lett.
دوره 94 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005