PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Reply to Gallagher: Different conceptions of embodiment
نویسنده
چکیده
Let me begin by thanking both the Dorothée Legrand, the editor of this special issue, and Timothy Bayne, general editor of PSYCHE for their great and sustained efforts to make this debate possible. Everyone who has ever done this type of service to the philosophical community knows how much work it really is – I am therefore more than grateful to both of them, and I am certain that the same is true of all my critics and commentators as well. Of course, I am also deeply indebted to all of the commentators themselves for making this debate possible, and for giving me the opportunity to learn from their interesting and substantial criticism. However, after some thought, and because their contributions explore a considerable range of quite diverse topics, I have finally decided to not organize my replies on the following pages along thematic lines and in a single piece, but to reply to each author individually. I hope that, for the majority of readers, this makes my replies more accessible.
منابع مشابه
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ ROBINSON: COLORS, AROUSAL, FUNCTIONALISM
Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper e...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Reply to Weisberg: No direction home—searching for neutral ground
I have learned a lot from Josh Weisberg’s substantial criticism in his well-crafted and systematic commentary (see also his book review in Weisberg 2003). Unfortunately, I have to concede many of the points he intelligently makes. But I am also flattered by the way he ultimately uses his criticism to emphasize some of those aspects of the theory that can perhaps possibly count as exactly the co...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ A Place for Protoconsciousness?
I argue that Gregg Rosenberg’s panexperientialism is either extremely implausible or irrelevant to the mystery of consciousness by introducing metaphysical and conceptual objections to his appeal to the notion of ‘protoconsciousness’.
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ OPIE: BEYOND THE FRINGE Beyond the Fringe
Mangan makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the structure and function of the nonsensory fringe of consciousness. I offer a few friendly amendments and criticisms. In particular, I argue that the fringe/focus structure of experience is considerably more complex than Mangan allows, and that his account of the function of fringe experience doesn’t do justice to the emergent nature ...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Reply to Ghin: Self-Sustainment on the Level of Global Availability
Of all the current philosophical attempts to rescue the concept of “self” by working out a weaker version, one that does not imply an ontological substance or an individual in the metaphysical sense, Marcello Ghin’s is clearly my favorite. His reconstruction of the original theory is absolutely accurate and without any major misunderstandings. Enriching the concept of a “SMT-system” with the no...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006