On the Parallels between Theoretical and Practical Rationality: Reply to Setiya

The causation in both domains consists, roughly, in subjects’ representing actions or propositions as favoured by other actions or propositions. But Setiya holds that Causalism is false in the theoretical case and that Equivalence is false in the practical case. Setiya contends, contra theoretical Causalism, that believing for a reason is just a form of belief. He holds that his propositional analysis of believing for a reason can account for the variant of Moore’s Paradox that figures prominently in my discussion: ‘q, so p; but I don’t believe p because I believe q.’ I argue, however, that a theory according to which believing for a reason is a species of belief has the resources only to explain the traditional paradox, i.e. why it is absurd to assert the relevant content, but then deny that one believes it. A causal connection between ground and grounded, understood in terms of the inferential activity of the agent, best accounts for the absurdity of the variant. I argue that many of the same considerations that support theoretical Equivalence, which Setiya accepts, equally well support practical Equivalence. Setiya’s argument against the latter fails, and fails for the same reason that it would fail against the former. Finally, I reply to the charge that the way I combine Causalism and Equivalence leaves no room to