Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator

Fault Jumping Attacks against Shrinking Generator

In this paper we outline two cryptoanalytic attacks against hardware implementation of the shrinking generator by Coppersmith et al., a classic design in low-cost, simple-design pseudorandom bitstream generator. This is a report on work on progress, since implementation and careful adjusting the attack strategy in order to optimize the atatck is still not completed.

Improved Cryptanalysis of the Self-Shrinking Generator

Recovering decimation-based cryptographic sequences by means of linear CAs

The sequences produced by the cryptographic sequence generator known as the shrinking generator can be modelled as the output sequences of linear elementary cellular automata. These sequences are composed of interleaved m-sequences produced by linear structures based on feedback shifts. This profitable characteristic can be used in the cryptanalysis of this generator. In this work we propose an...

An Improved Attack on the Shrinking Generator

This work proposes a known-plaintext attack on the Shrinking Generator through its characterization by means of Cellular Automata. It is based on the computation of the characteristic polynomials of sub-automata and on the generation of the Galois field associated to one of the Linear Feedback Shift Registers components of the generator. The proposed algorithm allows predicting a large number o...

Simple Cellular Automata-Based Linear Models for the Shrinking Generator

Structural properties of two well-known families of keystream generators, Shrinking Generators and Cellular Automata, have been analyzed. Emphasis is on the equivalence of the binary sequences obtained from both kinds of generators. In fact, Shrinking Generators (SG) can be identified with a subset of linear Cellular Automata (mainly rule 90, rule 150 or a hybrid combination of both rules). The...