Does Luck Exclude Control?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A problem for moral luck
The present paper poses a new problem for moral luck. Defenders of moral luck uncritically rely on a broader theory of luck known as the control theory or the lack of control theory. However, there are are two other analyses of luck in the literature that dominate discussion in epistemology, namely the probability and modal theories. However, moral luck is nonexistent under the probability and ...
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Luck egalitarianism — the theory that makes individual responsibility central to distributive justice, so that bad luck underwrites a more compelling case for redistribution than do the bad choices of the disadvantaged — has recently come under a sustained attack from critics who are deeply committed to the broader struggle for equality. These egalitarian critics object, first, that luck egalit...
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Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and tha t knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial knowle...
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Superstitious actions and belief in luck should, hypothetically, have no causal relationship to the actual outcomes of events. However, many individuals still develop and observe superstitions to potentially increase the likelihood that events turn out in their favor (Abbott & Sherratt, 2011). Prior research has shown that individuals with superstitious tendencies tend to have better performanc...
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In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such views—that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness—are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event’s being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main acco...
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تاریخ انتشار 2012