Information Update and Covert Modality in the Semantics of Propositional Attitude Verbs

This paper investigates previously unrecognized aspects of the interpretation of clausal arguments of propositional attitude predicates. It provides an account of them based on a newly identified modal operator in the lexical meaning of propositional attitude predicates, which applies to the context change in an attributed information state effected by the argument clause of the attitude predicate. Accounts of propositional attitude ascriptions in the literature have focused on explaining referential opacity and transparency, typically by incorporating modes of presentation of individuals; they have also focused on explaining anaphoric reference to propositions and facts introduced by clauses, including clausal arguments of propositional attitude verbs. See Cresswell (1985), Richard (1990) (1993), Crimmins (1992a) (1992b), Kamp (1985), Asher (1986) (1987) (1993), Gundel et al. (1999), Gundel et al. (2003), Hegarty (2003) (2006), Jaszczolt (2000) (2005), Recanati (2000), Moltmann (2003a) (2003b). Some of this work (Asher, 1987) has focused on variation in properties of propositional attitude ascription across different types of attitude verbs. There are a couple of dimensions of lexical semantic difference among attitude verbs which these accounts have not addressed, which are manifested in the different degrees of strength among suggest, propose, and assert, or between notice and prove. Where these have been addressed at all, they seem to have been regarded as independent of the characteristic properties of the propositional attitude context. This paper will show that these differences stem from the fact that there is a form of covert modality which is intrinsic to propositional attitude ascriptions. In particular, it will develop a dynamic semantic approach to the interpretation of clausal arguments (of a sort formulated, but rejected, by Moltmann (2003b)), formulated in terms of context change potential within the discourse, integrating the covert modality of propositional attitude ascriptions, analyzed using Kratzer’s (1991) theory of modality. This approach provides an account of fine-grained lexical differences among propositional attitude verbs of the sort noted above, while supporting accounts of referential opacity and other standard properties of attitude ascriptions.