Core-based criterion for extreme supermodular functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We give a necessary and sufficient condition for extremality of a supermodular function based on its min-representation by means of (vertices of) the corresponding core polytope. The condition leads to solving a certain simple linear equation system determined by the combinatorial core structure. This result allows us to characterize indecomposability in the class of generalized permutohedra. We provide an in-depth comparison between our result and the description of extremality in the supermodular/submodular cone achieved by other researchers.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Discrete Applied Mathematics
دوره 206 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016