A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result

نویسنده

  • Axel Anderson
چکیده

This paper considers a dynamic partnership model in which agents’ future productivity depends in part on their current match. Efficient rankings over human capital distributions are characterized in several common stochastic orders. These rankings are used to characterize the returns to human capital for individual agents in the associated market equilibrium. Assortative matching theorems are developed using the planner’s characterization results. While positive assortative matching is efficient given sufficient complementarity in static production and dynamic transitions, curvature assumptions on static production are necessary for a robust sorting theory in this dynamic environment. ∗I thank Lones Smith and seminar participants at the 3rd Annual Cowles-Caress GE Conference, University of Pennsylvania Search and Matching Workshop, Royal Econometric Society Annual Meeting: 2010, and Georgetown University. †Email: [email protected]

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness

Inspired by Roth and Sotomayor we make a deeper mathematical study of the assortative matching markets defined by Becker, finding explicit results on stability and fairness. We note that in the limit, when the size of the market tends to infinity, we obtain the continuous model of Sattinger and retrieve his characterization of the core of the game in this limit case. We also find that the most ...

متن کامل

Assortative Matching and Reputation

Consider Becker’s (1973) classic matching model, with unobserved fixed types and stochastic publicly observed output. If types are complementary, then matching is assortative in the known Bayesian posteriors (the ‘reputations’). We discover a robust failure of Becker’s result in the simplest dynamic two type version of this world. Assortative matching is generally neither efficient nor an equil...

متن کامل

Assortative Matching and Search

In Becker’s (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types are complements: i.e. match output f(x, y) is supermodular in x and y. We reprise this famous result assuming timeintensive partner search and transferable output. We prove existence of a search equilibrium with a continuum of types, and then characterize matching. After showing that Becker’s cond...

متن کامل

Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper Assortative Mating with Household Public Goods

This paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage result from joint consumption of household public goods. Assuming a class of utility functions which guarantee transferable utility within marriage, the paper proves that marriage markets will be characterized by positive assortative mating on income. A tendency for positive assortative mating on wages is also demonstra...

متن کامل

An Empirical Assessment of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market

In labor markets with worker and firm heterogeneity, the matching between firms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most productive workers and firms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal population-wide matched employer-employee data from Portugal. Using dynamic panel data methods, we quantify a firm-specific productivity term for each firm, and we relate this to the skil...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 159  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015