Prolegomenon to a Pragmatics of Emotion

One of the most important contribution to Argumentation Theory in the past few decades has been the Pragma-Dialectic approach led by van Eemeren and Grootendorst of the Amsterdam School. This programme presents a systematic theory intended to provide an analytical framework through which one can reconstruct and normatively investigate ordinary argumentative communication. The emphasis is very strongly on a “critical-rational” approach which relies on a language-based analysis: “Argumentative discourse should be studied as a specimen of normal verbal communication and interaction, and it should, at the same time, be measured against a certain standard of reasonableness” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst. 1992, p. 5). I have argued elsewhere (Gilbert, 1996) that arguments must be considered emotional as well as logical interactions, and, indeed, that other modes, specifically the visceral (physical) and kisceral (intuitive, mystical,) ought be included as well. I will not, in this talk, reiterate those arguments for the importance of taking emotion seriously as an integral component of argument analysis. Rather, I would like to try and move the programme forward by determining to what extent the emotional mode can be modeled or, better, viewed within the Pragma-Dialectic framework. I will argue in the first two parts that, to a fair extent, and by making only some very obvious and interesting changes, the pragma-dialectic approach can be applied to emotional argumentation in a useful way. In the final section I will present a principle that will permit further analogies to be developed. Throughout, I will be attempting to show that 1] dealing with emotions is an ordinary and integral aspect of argument analysis and or arguing itself; and, 2] dealing with emotions require similar interpretive and analytical skills as does dealing logically.1