Strategy-proof Voting for Multiple Public Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1 × ·· · × Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010