Too few physicians, or too many?

Rate Changes – Too many or too few ?

Medical Men in India: Too Few or Too Many

Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement. Cost sharing and supply.

This paper develops a model in which physicians choose the level of services to be provided to their patients. We show that if physicians undervalue benefits to patients relative to hospital profits, prospective payment, a system in which hospitals receive a payment dependent on the diagnosis-related group within which a patient falls, can lead to too few services being provided. In contrast, a...

Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons

This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, many of the other objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few obje...

On Moral Hazard and Joint R&D

This paper analyzes how the determinants of two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to conduct product innovation R&D projects alone, or in a cross license agreement, or in a research joint venture depend on the intrinsic nature of the R&D projects. Results show that in fundamental research — which is considered to be affected by moral hazard behavior of the researchers — there is a systematic bias t...