Resale and Collusion in a Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
The paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second-hand markets. It will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper shows that an active second-hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude, as do policies that affect the functioning of the second-hand market (e.g. leasing policy and buy-back). It will also, be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits.
منابع مشابه
Second-Hand Markets and Collusion by Manufacturers of Semidurable Goods.∗
I show that when oligopolistic firms manufacture semidurable goods, second-hand markets can play a key role in supporting collusive behavior. This in spite of the fact that a monopolist manufacturer has an incentive to eliminate second-hand markets – a point made by a number of authors. The idea that second-hand markets facilitate collusion is supported by the many examples in which manufacture...
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