Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims

We study the incentive issues associated with self-enforcing stochastic monitoring in a model of investment and production. The e¢ cient contract features a debt-like payment with a threshold in terms of the reported output in which all of the reported output is taken up to the threshold if monitoring doesn’t occur and all of the output is taken if monitoring does occur. An output report above the threshold leads to zero probability of monitoring and just the threshold amount being paid out. The e¢ ciency gap between the self-enforcing contract and the commitment constraint is minimized when the monitors holds no part of the residual claim on the …rm, which we associate with equity. Misreporting by the manager is an important component of the e¢ cient contract. I would like to thank Narayana Kocherlakota, Jon Pogach, Andy Postelwaite, Martin Schneider, Vasiliki Skreta and Xi Weng for their comments. I gratefully acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation.