Heidegger on das Man - Rewrite

Section 1 establishes some key similarities between Heidegger and Georg Simmel in order to motivate the hypothesis that Simmel’s account of how society is possible can be used to give an account of das Man which reconciles the transcendentally philosophical role emphasised by Dreyfus with the ethically negative features emphasised by Olafson. Section 2 elaborates the issue addressed in Ch. 4 of Division I in Being and Time and on this basis provides an account das Man, which, unlike Olafson’s, captures the status Heidegger gives it as a genuine Existential, but, unlike Dreyfus’, does not interpret it in a ‘socially normative’ sense. Simmel’s social ontology is then used (§ 3) to integrate into Heidegger’s account those features of das Man which lead Dreyfus to accuse Heidegger of illicit lapse into ontic social critique. Simmel’s usefulness is then shown to derive from the even-handed way he treats both the ‘inner’ and ‘intentional’ and the ‘outer’ and ‘social’, namely, as internally related, complementary moments of the individual. Since such even-handedness is inimical to the anti-mentalism underpinning Dreyfus’ Heidegger interpretation, Dreyfus cannot avail himself of Simmel in the manner undertaken here. Section 4 shows that Dreyfus’ reading of das Man fails to address what is at issue in Ch.4. Finally, (§ 5) the reading developed here is used to resolve the apparent contradiction in what Heidegger says about the relations between das Man and authentic being-a-self. It also suggests what stance is appropriate on the translational issue as to whether das Man is better translated as ‘the One’ or as ‘the They’.