The effect of induced compliance on relative left frontal cortical activity: a test of the action-based model of dissonance

The action-based model of dissonance and recent advances in neuroscience suggest that commitment to action should cause greater relative left frontal cortical activity. An induced compliance experiment was conducted in which electroencephalographic activity was recorded following commitment to action, operationalized with a perceived choice manipulation. Perceived high as compared to low choice to engage in the counterattitudinal action caused attitudes to be more consistent with the action. Also, high choice caused greater relative left frontal cortical activity than low choice. Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. The original theory of dissonance (Festinger, 1957) posited that inconsistency among important elements of knowledge (cognitions) creates dissonance, an unpleasant emotional-motivational state. This state was presumed to cause organisms to do cognitive work in an attempt to reduce the dissonance. The original theory used the same word, ‘dissonance,’ to describe both the discrepancy between cognitions and the emotive state provoked by this discrepancy. To improve clarity about the processes, we use the terms ‘dissonance’ or ‘dissonance arousal’ to describe the emotive state and the term ‘cognitive discrepancy’ to describe the inconsistency between cognitions. When dissonance is evoked, and organisms reduce it by changing their ‘cognitive world’ (i.e., attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors), we refer to the process as ‘discrepancy reduction.’ When the negative emotionalmotivational state is successfully eliminated or reduced, we call this ‘dissonance reduction.’ Several revisions have been proposed to explain the data generated by dissonance theory. Some revisions focused on the role of the self-concept or self-esteem as being important in dissonance artment of Psychology, Texas A&M University, 4235 TAMU, College Station, s, Ltd. Received 17 February 2006 Accepted 22 June 2006 36 Eddie Harmon-Jones et al. processes. However, research has demonstrated problems with those explanations (Harmon-Jones, 2000). It is likely that self aspects may moderate dissonance processes but that they may not be necessary to cause dissonance (Harmon-Jones, 2000; Stone & Cooper, 2001). Other revisions have been proposed and empirically challenged, and much research has continued to support the original theory (Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 1996; Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). However, the original theory never clearly specified why cognitive discrepancy caused the negative emotive state of dissonance and why individuals were motivated to reduce dissonance and discrepancy. To address these questions, the action-based model was proposed (Harmon-Jones, 1999). It builds on the earlier idea of an unequivocal behavioral orientation (Gerard, 1965) and integrates it with recent ideas about action orientation and implemental mindsets (Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1984, 2000). In the end, the action-based model accepts the original theory of dissonance and hopes to extend it by positing why cognitive discrepancy causes the negative emotive state of dissonance and why individuals are motivated to reduce dissonance and discrepancy. ACTION-BASED MODEL OF DISSONANCE The action-based model of dissonance begins with the assumption that perceptions and cognitions can serve as action tendencies. Discrepancy between cognitions evokes dissonance because discrepancy has the potential to interfere with effective and unconflicted action. Discrepancy reduction, by bringing cognitions into consonance, serves the function of facilitating the execution of effective and unconflicted action (Gerard, 1965; Jones & Gerard, 1967). The action-based model accepts the ideas of Brehm and Cohen (1962) in that it posits that behavioral commitment provides the base around which dissonance reduction occurs. In other words, according to Brehm and Cohen (1962; see also Beauvois & Joule, 1996), most dissonance situations can be evaluated as decision situations. Once the individual decides on a course of action or makes a behavioral commitment, s/he enhances the value of the chosen course of action and reduces the value of the rejected course of action. Jones and Gerard (1967) went further to suggest that the individual attempts to ‘maintain an unequivocal behavioral orientation toward his acts (p. 194).’ The action-based model proposes that, after a decision (commitment) is made, the processing that occurs should assist with the execution of the decision. The tendency to move toward viewing the chosen course of action more positively or less negatively after a decision (i.e., attitude change) should help the individual to follow through and act on the decision in a more effective manner. STATE ACTION-ORIENTATION AND SPREADING OF ALTERNATIVES The post-decisional state is similar to the action-oriented state (Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1984). When a person is in an action-oriented state, implementation of decisions is enhanced. Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002) proposed that the action-oriented state that follows decision-making is equivalent to the state in which dissonance motivation operates and discrepancy reduction occurs. They found that experimentally manipulating the degree of action-orientation experienced following a decision affected the degree of discrepancy reduction (as measured by attitude change). Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 35–45 (2008)