The Non-existence of Equilibrium in Sequential Auctions When Bids Are Revealed
نویسندگان
چکیده
Sequential auctions of homogeneous objects are common in public and private marketplaces. Weber derived equilibrium results for what is now a classic model of sequential auctions. However, Weber’s results are derived in the context of two particular price quote assumptions. In this paper, we examine a model of sequential auctions based on online auctions, in which, after each auction, all bids are revealed. We show that a pure-strategic, symmetric equilibrium does not exist, regardless of whether the auctions are firstor second-price, if all bids are revealed at the end of each auction.
منابع مشابه
Flexible Decision-Making in Sequential Auctions
CAI, GANGSHU. Flexible Decision-Making in Sequential Auctions. (Under the direction of Assistant Professor Peter R. Wurman). Because sequential auctions have permeated society more than ever, it is desirable for participants to have the optimal strategies beforehand. However, finding closed-form solutions to various sequential auction games is challenging. Current literature provides some answe...
متن کاملGone in 60 Seconds: Last-minute Bidding on Ebay Auctions
This is a theoretical and empirical study of the delay of bid submission due to strategic last-minute bidding in eBay. We consider a two-period model in which two identical items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers. We show that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which the bidders wait until the last minute to submit their bids in the first auction. The last-minute bidding arises f...
متن کاملExistence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids
We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealedbid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case of independent valuations and two ways of breaking ties: Vickrey tie-breaking and random tie-breaking.
متن کاملIndicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry∗
When selling a business by auction, investment banks frequently use indicative bids – non-binding preliminary bids – to select a limited number of bidders to participate. We show that if participation is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly-increasing strategies, but bidders “pool” over a finite number of bids, so the highest-value bidders are not a...
متن کاملFraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time
This paper studies the sales of a single indivisible object where bidders have continuous valuations. In Grigorieva et al. [14] it was shown that, in this setting, query auctions necessarily allocate inefficiently in equilibrium. In this paper we propose a new sequential auction, called the c-fraction auction. We show the existence of an ex-post equilibrium, called bluff equilibrium, in which b...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007