Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium

نویسندگان

  • Oren Ben-Zwi
  • Ron Lavi
  • Ilan Newman
چکیده

We present a family of submodular valuation classes that generalizes gross substitute. We show that Walrasian equilibrium always exist for one class in this family, and there is a natural ascending auction which finds it. We prove some new structural properties on gross-substitute auctions which, in turn, show that the known ascending auctions for this class (Gul-Stacchetti and Ausbel) are, in fact, identical. We generalize these two auctions, and provide a simple proof that they terminate in a Walrasian equilibrium.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1301.1153  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013