Multi-leader-follower Games: Models, Methods and Applications

نویسندگان

  • Ming Hu
  • Masao Fukushima
چکیده

The multi-leader-follower game serves as an important model in game theory with many applications in economics, operations research and other fields. In this survey paper, we first recall some background materials in game theory and optimization. In particular, we present several extensions of Nash equilibrium problems including the multi-leader-follower game. We then give some applications as well as solution methods of multi-leader-follower games.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015