Probability, Modality and Triviality
نویسنده
چکیده
Many philosophers accept the following three theses: (1) that probability is amodal concept; (2) that, if determinism is true, therewould still be objective modal facts; and (3) that if determinism is true, there are no genuine objective probabilities (chances). I argue that these 3 claims are inconsistent, and that their widespread acceptance is thus quite troubling. I suggest, as others have, that we should reject the last thesis: objective probability is perfectly compatible with determinism. Nevertheless we must still explain why this thesis seems attractive; I suggest that a subtle equivocation is to blame.
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